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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
IVAN JENKINS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
C~~RLES M. PARRISH, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15905 
This is an action which was commenced by Plaintiff against 
several defendants alleging medical malpractice in the perfor-
mance of open-heart surgery. Plaintiff claimed that as a result 
of Defendant's negligence he sustained permanent damage to his 
brain resulting in various physical impairments. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Prior to trial all defendants, except for Dr. Charles M. 
Parrish, were dismissed by stipulation of the parties. A jury 
trial was commenced on September 19, 1977 with the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary presiding. After nine days of hearings the jury 
returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Defendant Parrish and 
against Plaintiff. The trial court subsequently denied Plain-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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tiff's motion for a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Parrish seeks affirmance of the jury verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts as presented in Appellant's brief·, L, 
in the opinion of Respondent, totally inadequate in that it pre-
sents argument rather than a factual development of this case. 
For this reason, Respondent offers the following Statement of 
Facts as developed in trial. 
The plaintiff, Ivan Jenkins, testified that after droppi~ 
out of high school he joined the army and then in 1951 commenced 
work with Kennecott Copper. (Tr., p. 1261). For the next 20 
years he worked mostly labor jobs including being a "roster" 
and a "rigger". (Tr., p. 1263). All of these jobs required 
physical climbing and exertion. (Tr. , p. 12 6 3) • 
Jenkins stated that in 1965 or 1966 he began experiencing 
problems with his chest. The pain originated below his chest 
and continued to increase in severity. At one point he could 
not walk SO yards across the parking lot without having severe 
pain. (Tr., p. 1304). 
Dr. Owen G. Reese, a Kennecott physician, recalled that as 
early as 1966 the plaintiff had complained of chest pains. It 
was not until 1971, however, that the doctor was able to diagnose 
the pain as a true angina. 1 1774) Dr. Reese hospi-cTr., p. · 
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talized the plaintiff in 1971 for testing as to the exact cause 
of the plaintiff's pain. (Tr., p. 1775). 
Dr. Reese called Dr. Parrish and asked him to conduct an ar-
teriogram. (Tr., p. 1775). Defendant Dr. Parrish explained 
that in January of 1972 he performed selective coronary angio-
graphy in which dye is injected into the blood and x-rays are 
taken. The angiograph showed severe occlusive triple vessel co-
ronary disease. (Tr., p. 1565). 
Plaintiff and his wife related that Dr. Parrish subsequently 
informed them as to the risks of the bypass surgery and told them 
that Plaintiff should have a good chance of survival because of 
his age and habits. (Tr., p. 792, 1268). 
The plaintiff and his wife shortly thereafter decided to 
go ahead with the operation and the plaintiff was sent to the 
hospital to have blood drawn for a c.ross match. The plaintiff 
was checked into the hospital on February 20. (Tr., p. 1567). 
That night Dr. Parrish explained to the plaintiff and his wife 
the extent and nature of the operation. (Tr., pp. 1568, 1270). 
On February 21 at 7:30 a.~. the plaintiff was taken into 
the Holy Cross Hospital operating room. (Tr., pp. 912-913). 
Dr. Parrish testified that the surgical team operating on the 
plaintiff consisted of himself, the chief surgical resident, Dr. 
Parrish's own nurse, two additional nurses supplied by the hos-
pital, a circulating nurse, the anesthesiologist, and the pump 
-3-
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technician. (Tr., p. 1586. 
Morphine was used as the anesthesia during the operation. 
The anesthesiologist maintained and monitored the blood pr es sun 
of the plaintiff up until the time the heart-lung machine was 
activated. (Tr., pp. 906-809). 
Dr. Parrish then described the remainder of the operation. 
Veins were removed from a superficial venous system in the legs. 
The chest was then opened and the heart was exposed. Plastic 
tubes were then attached to various areas of the heart and to 
the femoral artery. During the preceding process the plain-
tiff's heart was still pumping. The heart-lung machine was 
then primed with blood, evacuated of all air, and the machine w< 
activated by the pump technician. The heart-lung machine began 
to circulate the blood in place of the heart and to cool the 
blood as it circulated. As the body temperature dropped the 
heart slowed its beat and finally an ice saline solution was 
poured over the heart and within a matter of seconds the heart 
stopped beating. (Tr., pp. 1590-1592). The body temperature 
at this point was approximately 30 to 34 degrees centigrade. 
(Tr., p. 1591). 
Mr. Charles Dyson, a Los Angeles pump technician testify-
ing for Plaintiff, explained that the machine acts in place of 
the heart during the operation; that is, it circulates the ~­
tient' s blood through the arteries and veins and at the same 
-4-
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time oxygenates the blood. (Tr. , p. 113 7) • 
Dr. Parrish explained that the blood coming from the ven-
ous system is blue whereas the blood going through the arterial 
system is red. (Tr., pp. 1626-1627). A TV-screen type of os-
cilloscope is attached to the patient which monitors both the 
arterial pressure and the venous pressure. (Tr., pp. 899-900). 
Dr. Parrish stated that two units of blood were used during 
the operation: the first unit for priming of the pump to com-
pensate for the machine itself and the second unit to compen-
sate for internal pooling and loss of blood. (Tr., p. 1658). 
Using the veins from the plaintiff's leg, Dr. Parrish 
fashioned three grafts to circumvent the blocked arteries 
which supplied blood to the plaintiff's heart muscle. 
After the operation was completed the heart-lung machine 
increased the temperature of the blood circulating through the 
body until such time as the temperature was high enough to allow 
the heart to be shocked back into operation. (Tr., pp. 1597, 
1643). The operation of Plaintiff was completed at 12:45 p.m. 
(Tr., p. 913). 
The plaintiff was then placed into the intensive care unit 
of the hospital where his vital signs continued to be monitored. 
At 7:10 p.m. that night the plaintiff's blood pressure severely 
dropped. At that time Dr. Parrish ordered two drugs to be admin-
istered in order to increase the blood pressure. (Tr., PP· 1029-
1030) . 
-5-
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On the day following the operation the plaintiff's . 
cond1-
tion had stabilized. (Tr., p. 1610). The plaintiff remained 
in the intensive care unit for five days until he was subse-
quently taken to a private room. (Tr. , p. 7 9 7) . 
Plaintiff claimed at trial that he immediately noticed vi-
sual problems upon awakening from the surgery. (Tr., p. 1271), 
Plaintiff's wife verified that her husband was complaining about 
his vision immediately after the surgery. (Tr., p. 795). She 
stated that during the rest of his stay at the hospital he co~ 
stantly complained about his vision. (Tr., pp. 795-799). She 
testified that Dr. Parrish was informed of this fact but merely 
assured them that the plaintiff's system was in a state of shock 
and would be all right after it had recovered. (Tr., p. 797). 
Plaintiff called several friends, relatives, and business 
associates who testified tha.t during his stay at the hospital 
and immediately after his return to his home the plaintiff com· 
plained about vision problems. (Tr., pp. 1092, 1247, 1253, 
1441, 1540). 
Defendant Dr. Parrish stated that the first time he knew 
that the plaintiff had a neurological problem was in April of 
1972, approximately six weeks after the operation. He could 
d hl.Jll, about his not recall any complaints that Plaintiff ma e to 
eyesight while in the hospital. (T 8 5 o) The doctor sta· r.' p. . 
ted that had Plaintiff told him of any visual or coordination 
problems he would have been very concerned as to the question 
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of neurological damage. (Tr., pp. 851-852). 
Defendants called Dr. Owen Reese the Kennecott h · · 
, p ysician 
who had cared for Plaintiff during his employment, and asked 
him if Plaintiff had made any complaints concerning his vision 
or coordination during office visits in February and March of 
1972. The doctor replied that his records showed no such com-
plaints and that his memory also was barren of any such com-
plaints. (Tr., pp. 1776-1777). 
The defendant called Donna Jorgensen, an LPN who worked at 
Holy Cross in 1972, who testified that she could recall the 
plaintiff making no complaints to her and that had such complaints 
been made they would have been charted. The records revealed no 
such notations. (Tr . , p . 1 7 6 6 ) . 
Likewise, Sister Mary Agnes Mullen explained that she was 
a registered nurse in charge of patient relations in 1972. She 
was assigned to the intensive care and post intensive care units 
and met with the patients and their families one to three times 
a day. She could not recall Plaintiff or his wife making any 
complaints as to his condition. (Tr., pp. 1768-1770). The hos-
pital records, which were admitted into evidence, also reflected 
no comments made by the nursing staff concerning Plaintiff's 
vision or coordination. (Exhibit 13-D, "Nursing Clinical Sum-
maries".) 
Plaintiff testified that since the operation he experienced 
blurred vision a weakness in his right arm, a loss of equilibrium, , 
-7-
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a speech problem, and an inability to get along with hi's f 
riends 
and family. (Tr., pp. 1278-1280). His wife related her hus-
band's coordination problems, vision problems, speech problems, 
and irritability. (Tr., pp. 809:;-813). Various other witnesses 
called by Plaintiff substantiated this behavior. (Tr· ' PP. 109). 
1093, 1248, 1255). 
On cross-examination the plaintiff stated that he had gone 
fishing five or six times after the operation, had gone deer 
hunting twice and had shot one deer, was still bowling, and 
still had a Utah driver's license. (Tr. , pp. 12 9 7-13 0 5) . 
Dr. Parrish testified that he had examined the plaintiff 
in April and July of 1972 and February of 1973. (Tr., p. 860), 
By February of 1973 it became apparent that the plaintiff was 
suffering from a neurological problem. (Tr., p. 863). 
The plaintiff introduced the video-tape deposition of Dr. 
William Hoyt, a neuro-opthalmologist from San Francisco (Tr., p. 
1218--testimony has not been transcribed for this appeal) and 
the deposition testimony of Dr. Ward Woods, a San Diego, Cali-
fornia surgeon with a specialty in neurology and neurosurgery. 
(Tr., pp. 1474-1536). Both Dr. Hoyt and Dr. Woods described to 
the jury the neurological reasons for the symptoms suffered by 
the plaintiff. 
· sue It was the cause of these symptoms that comprised the is 
in this case. 
. , £f's Defendant Dr. Parrish contended that Plainti 
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neurological damage probably resulted from a stroke suffered 
after the plaintiff had left the hospital. 'T 6 c r · , pp. l B, 6 3 2) • 
He explained that the symptoms could also have been caused by 
a particle of a blood clot from the heart being pumped to the 
brain during or after the surgery--a normal risk of such a sur-
gical procedure. (Tr., p. 1026). 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the neurologi-
cal problem was caused during the surgery because of a failure 
to properly operate the heart-bypass pump in a manner which 
provided sufficient oxygen to Plaintiff's brain cells. 
Extensive testimony from both sides was heard as to the 
technical aspects necessary for a successful heart bypass opera-
tion. Without going into detail, Plaintiff called Charles Dyson, 
a certified Los Angeles pump technician, who stated that the re-
cords concerning Plaintiff's operation showed improper use of 
the machine and that the procedure followed by the defendant 
and his pump technician did not meet the minimum standard of 
care required in 1972. (Tr., pp. 1108-1186). 
Dr. Charles Bailey, a heart surgeon residing in New Jersey, 
also reviewed the procedure utilized in Plaintiff's operation 
and concluded that Defendant had failed to properly utilize the 
heart-lung machine thereby causing a deficient oxygen flow to 
the brain during the operation. (Tr., pp. 1306-1419). 
A detailed analysis of the testimony of both .Mr. Dyson and 
Dr. Bailey will be presented ;.n Point II of the argument section 
-9-
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of this brief concerning the adrnissibili ty of testimony as to 
the standard of care. 
Dr. Hoyt, during his video-tape deposition also stated~~ 
in his opinion Plaintiff's brain damage was caused by hypoxia 
during the open-heart surgery. , Dr. Ward Woods voiced his opinic: 
that the neurological damage was caused during the operation. 
(Tr. , p. 15 0 5) . 
Dr. Parrish, ~m the other hand, testified that the operaticr 
was perforrned in a safe manner and in accordance with the stan· 
dard of care prevailing in 1972 and justified all procedures 
used in the surgery. (Tr. , pp. 8 7 8-10 3 8) . 
Dr. Richard Hughes, a cardiovascular surgeon practicing ir. 
Los Angeles, testified that Dr. Parrish performed the surgery 
in accordance with the standards of practice generally accepted 
in 1972. (Tr., pp. 1669-1735). 
Finally, Dr. Russell Nelson, a cardiovascular surgeon prac· 
ticing in Salt Lake City, disputed the claimed errors made by 
Plaintiff as to the correct procedure followed by Dr. Parrish 
and explained that Dr. Parrish operated in accordance with t~ 
standard prevailing in 1972. (Tr., pp. 1736-1763). 
After nine days of trial the matter was submitted to the 
jury. A unanimous verdict was returned in favor of the defenda; 
and against the plaintiff. (Tr., pp. 1891-1892). 
· for New Triai On March 22, 1978,Plaintiff argued his Motion 
or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. (Tr., pp. 546-582). 
-10-
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Both motions were denied. (R., p. 529). 
Plaintiff now appeals from the judgment on the verdict and 
from the denial of these motions. (R., p. 531). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS VENIREMAN 
EDDINS FOR CAUSE. 
A. Based Upon the Examination of Jurors, the Trial Court 
Properly Exercised its Discretion in Refusing to Dismiss venire-
man Eddins for Cause. 
It is universally recognized that it is the prerogative of 
the trial judge to examine and pass on the qualification of ju-
rors including their credibility as to their qualification. 
State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 806 (Utah 1977) (J. Crockett, dis-
senting). 
Matters of possible juror bias or prejudice rest within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Dixon, 560 
P.2d 318 (Utah 1977). The ruling of a trial court concerning a 
prospective juror will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous 
or where there has been an abuse of judicial discretion. State v. 
Amodei, 563 P.2d 440 (Kan. 1977). With this standard in mind 
an examination of the record clearly shows that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss Venireman 
Eddins. 
During the examination of the prospective juror panel the 
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trial court first asked whether any of the J'urors would f 
re use 
to follow the Court's instruction regardless of the J'uror• 
s Per. 
sonal belief. No venireman responded. (Tr., p. 674). 
The court then asked the veniremen whether an;_r of them 
if chosen as a juror would not try the case solely upon the evi· 
dence adduced before them and the witnesses which appeared be-
fore them. None of the veniremen replied. (Tr., p. 675), 
The court then proceeded to ask the veniremen if any of 
them knew the prospective witnesses or parties. Venireman Hud-
son stated that he was acquainted with two of Plaintiff's witne: 
ses and may be influenced because they were good friends. (Tr., 
p. 678). Venireman Hudson was then asked by the court if it 
developed during the evidence that the testimony of his friend 
was obviously wrong in light of other evidence whether he would 
still believe the testimony of the friend even knowing that tne 
testimony was obviously wrong. Venireman Hudson replied, "God, 
I don't know. It's hard to say, Judge Leary, Your Honor." 
The trial court then asked Venireman Hudson, 
Well, would you be able to--if the testimony 
was either wrong or erroneous, and you knew 
that individual who testified--to be able to 
put aside your acquaintanceship with them and 
to render a fair and impartial verdict in ac-
cordance with the evidence? 
VENIREMAN HUDSON: I really don't know. I 
really don't know. It's just the way it in-
fluences me. (Tr., p. 680). 
Venireman Eddins, the person now in question 1 stated that 
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she also knew one of the plaintiff's witnesses, Dr. Robert 
Wray. (Tr., p. 678). This Court should note that the plain-
tiff's statement in his brief that Mrs. Eddins was a personal 
acquaintance of one of the "defendant's" expert witnesses is 
therefore obviously incorrect. (Appellant's brief, p. 12; Tr., 
pp. 660-661). When Venireman Eddins was asked whether her ac-
quaintanceship with Plaintiff's witness would cause her to give 
more weight to his testimony she replied, "No, I would be fair 
and impartial as far as knowing Dr. Wray is concerned." (Tr., 
p. 68 0) • 
A third venireman, Mrs. Timothy, stated that she also knew 
one of Plaintiff's witnesses and stated that she would be able 
to fairly hear the evidence in spite of this acquaintanceship. 
(Tr., p. 681). Finally, Venireman Hewett stated he had employed 
Mr. Fairbourn previously as his attorney. (Tr., p. 676). 
The court then asked the veniremen whether any of them had 
a belief that a case of this nature should not be brought into 
court for deterrnination by a jury. Venireman Birkner and James 
Hewett both raised their hands. (Tr., p. 681). 
The court then asked the venire..~en if any of there had any 
belief or feeling toward any of the parties, attorneys or wit-
nesses that might be regarded as a bias or prejudice for one or 
against any of them. None of the veniremen responded. (Tr., PP· 
681-682). 
The court then asked several other questions including whe-
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ther any of the veniremen had ever been sued or whethe . 
r a SlJni-
lar claim had been presented against them or any member 
of theu 
friends or famili'es. (Tr pp 683 684) v · 
· ' · - . enireman Eddins re-
plied, "My ex-husband was a veternarian and had one case." (Tr., 
p. 684). No further discussion ~oncerning her relationship 
with her ex-husband or the nature of the case was entered into 
by the court or requested by counsel. 
Next, the court inquired whether any members of the venire· 
men had family or close friends with special training in medicfr 
Mrs. Eddins replied that her father was an M.D., Venireman Hewet 
replied that her uncle was a radiobiologist, Mr. Gardner repliec 
his mother-in-law was a nurse, Mrs. McDonald replied her daught1 
was a nurse, Mrs. Birkner replied that her cousin was a nurse, 
and Mrs. McRoberts replied that her sister was a nursing studem. 
(Tr., p. 684). In addition, Venireman Hilton responded that 
her niece was a radiologist, and Venireman Nelson stated that 
she had worked as a nu=se's aide for nine years. (Tr., p. 685). 
Finally, the court, in closing, asked if there was any ~t 
son that had occurred to any of the veniremen during question· 
ing that might make them doubtful that they would be completely 
fair and impartial in this case. Mrs. Eddins replied, "The fac: 
my father was an M.D. I'm sure would influence me." (Tr., P· 
689) • 
A hearing was held in chambers before the court and with 
various veniremen as to their qualifications. In chambers Mr. 
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Fairbourn, Plaintiff's co-counsel, stated that, "Mrs. Eddins 
has indicated that her father is a physician and that she has 
stated that she believes that she would be unduly biased and 
prejudiced by this fact." The court replied, "Well, r didn't 
pursue that matter with her." (Tr., p. 689a). 
In addition, Plaintiff challenged the qualifications of 
venireman Birkner and Venireman James Hewett who had told the 
court that they believed this type of case should not be brought. 
(Tr., p. 689a). Finally, Mr. Slagle, attorney for Defendant, 
requested that he be able to examine Mr. Ardin Hewett as to his 
attorney-client relationship with Mr. Fairbourn. (Tr., p. 690). 
The court accordingly asked each venireman to come into 
chambers individually. Venireman Birkner stated that she did 
not think that malpractice actions should be brought because 
doctors do the best they can. She stated that ·she had read ar-
ticles about malpractice and does not believe in medical malprac-
tice cases. (Tr., pp. 691-692). 
Venireman James Hewett stated that the plaintiff was ob-
viously needing medical attention or would not have asked for 
it and that it must have been successful because the plaintiff 
was still alive. (Tr., p. 693). Venireman James Hewett then 
stated that he was not sure that anyone had the right to bring 
a malpractice action and that his attitude would remain the same 
even if the doctor was shown to be negligent. lTr., P· 6951. 
-15-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-Venireman Ardin Hewitt was then interviewed by the 
court 
and stated that he had once employed Mr. Fairbourn in a child 
custody case. He stated that this would not have an effect 
upon his ability to weigh evidence. He stated that he could 
listen to the evidence and give a fair and impartial verdict. 
(Tr., pp. 696-697). 
Both Veniremen Birkner and Venireman James Hewett were cha:. 
lenged by Plaintiff for cause. (Tr . , pp • 6 9 2 , 6 9 6 ) • 
Venireman Eddins was then called into the court's chambers 
for examination. This dialogue between Mrs. Eddins and the 
court has been partially quoted in Appellant's brief and Appel-
lant has emphasized various statements made by her. (Appellant'' 
brief, pp. 13-14). Respondent believes that other statements 
are equally important and should be emphasized and that some of 
the crucial testimony was omitted. The following dialogue oc-
curred between Mrs. Eddins and the court: 
THE COURT: Sit down, Mrs. Eddins. I just 
want to make some inquiry as to some of 
your qualifications to serve. One of the 
things I'm a little bit concerned with is 
your response as to whether there was any-
thing that would make you think that you 
might not be a fair and impartial juror in 
this matter. You indicated that--the fact 
that your father either was or had been an 
M.D.--
VENIREMAN EDDINS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You thought this might, for 
one reason or another, influence your de-
termination in connection with this mat-
ter. I suppose maybe I ought to ask you: 
-16-
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Because of your father being a medical doc-
tor, would you be inclined to give more 
weight to the testimony of a medical"d;"ctor 
simply because he's a medical doctor? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: I think I probably would. 
THE COURT: Would you give less weight to 
his testimony? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: No. 
THE COURT: Would you be inclined to give 
more weight to the testimony of--well, perhaps 
I'd better not ask it that way. Even though 
your father is a medical doctor, do I under-
stand that you do not believe that you would 
be able to listen to the evidence and based 
thereon render a fair and impartial verdict? 
Or, let me put it another way: Do you think 
if you were selected as a juror that you 
would be able to listen to the evidence and 
based thereon render a fair and impartial 
verdict? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: I definitely believe they 
can make mistakes. I would hope I could lis-
ten to it. But I know I would be somewhat 
partial to the doctor. 
THE COURT: Well, are you telling me that 
you would give more weight to the testimony 
which would be presented on behalf of the 
defendant in this action simply because he 
happens to be a medical doctor? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: No, I think I could weigh 
the evidence. I think when it got to his 
personal testimony that would be the only 
time it would possibly influence me, and I 
would feel it was more likely to be truthful 
than untruthful. 
THE COURT: And I take it, then, your answer 
would be that you would give more weight to 
his testimony simply because he's a doctor? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: I'm afraid so. 
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THE COURT: Would you give less weight to 
his testimony because he's a doctor? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: No. 
THE COURT: If the evidence indicated that 
the doctor's testimony was not in accordance 
with the evidence, would you still be inclined 
to give more weight to his testimony simply 
because he was a doctor? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: No, I think I could see it. 
THE COURT: I'll ask it this way: I think 
you've answered the question, ma'am, but do 
you think that actions such as this should 
not be brought against--not be brought? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: No, I don't think they 
shouldn't be brought. 
THE COURT: Do you think that they, if the 
situation warranted such an action, would 
be appropriate? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: Certainly. 
701) (Emphasis added). 
(Tr., pp. 699-
Subsequently, the veniremen panel was brought back into 
court at which time Plaintiff moved to dismiss Venireman Bir~ 
and James Hewett for cause. This motion was granted. (Tr., P 
709). Defendant moved to dismiss Venireman Hudson for cause a 
this motion was granted. (Tr., p. 710) • The motion to dismi: 
Mrs. Eddins was denied. (Tr. , p. 7 0 9) • 
The preceding review of the venire examination reveals 
that the court carefully examined the panel as to every facet 
of possible bias or prejudice. The court felt that two oft~ 
veniremen were not qualified to serve because of their prejud: 
b · · 1 t · t · The court also felt t: against ringing a ma prac ice ac ion. 
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one of the veniremen could not render a fair verdict in light 
of his relationship with a witness. On the other hand, the court 
ruled that Mrs. Eddins was a qualified juror based upon her re-
sponse to the questioning. 
The trial court was correct in this ruling. Plaintiff ne-
ver challenged Mrs. Eddins or inquired further into the fact 
that her ex-husband who was a veternarian had been previously 
involved in an action. (Tr., p. 689). The fact that Mrs. Ed-
dins was a personal acquaintance of one of Plaintiff's proposed 
expert witnesses, Dr. Robert Wray, can hardly be said to be pre-
judicial to Plaintiff. 
Likewise, the fact that Mrs. Eddins' father was a physician 
was not challenged per se any more than the other veniremen who 
stated they had relatives who were also in the medical field. 
The only basis for such a challenge was Mrs. Eddins' own state-
ments made to the court. An examination of these statements 
revealed no abuse in the court's discretion. 
First, the fact that Mrs. Eddins stated she would be inclined 
to give more weight to the testimony of ~ medical doctor because 
he's a medical doctor would not adversely affect Plaintiff any 
more than Defendant since Plaintiff called three medical doctors 
himself. (Tr., p. 699). 
Second, Mrs. Eddins stated that she could weight the evi-
dence but that she thought it more likely a doctor would be truth-
ful than untruthful. 
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The court in Wheeler v. State, 362 So.2d 377 (Fla. App. 
1978} faced a similar claim that a juror was disqualified be-
cause of her stateffients. The court therein stated: 
No prejudicial error appears in the trial 
court's denial of Appellant's challenge 
for cause of a prospective juror whom Ap-
pellant later struck peremptorily. The 
prospective juror simply stated that she 
had great respect for police officers and 
that it would be difficult for her to be-
lieve that a police officer had testified 
untruthfully. That feeling did not dis-
qualify the prospective juror. Id. at 
378. (Emphasis added}. 
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fif~ 
Circuit held that the statement of a prospective juror that he 
would give more credibility to an F.B.I. agent than to any othe: 
witness did not constitute grounds for reversal. United States 
v. Cross, 474 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1973). 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana also held that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss a pros· 
pective juror whose husband was a law enforcement officer and 
who stated that she would be more inclined to believe a law en· 
forcement officer than other witnesses. State v. Qualls, 353 Sc. 
978 (La. 1977). 
Finally, the Florida Appellate Court in Williams v. Nowlis 
297 So.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1974) held that the trial court erred 
in dis:rr.issing prospective jurors who said they would give more 
weight to the testimony of a physician than a chiropractor. 
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court stated: 
It is, of course, a juror's prerogative to 
d~termine the weight and believability he 
will accord to a particular witness's testi-
mony, and he makes that determination from 
various factors including his general know-
ledge. If a juror in the final analysis after 
hearing the testimony can make that determina-
tion based upon his understanding of such fac-
tors, he should not be stricken for cause. 
Of course, questions on voir dire may uncover 
such prejudice on the part of a juror that he 
could not fairly make such a determination, 
but here the questions asked the juror did 
not go far enough or to the point of unco-
vering prejudice. A judgment based upon a 
juror's understanding of the qualifications 
of an expert witness in a particular field 
based upon his common sense, judgment and 
experience is not prejudice. It is his duty 
and responsibility to make such determina-
tion. Id. at 83-84. 
Venireman Eddins clearly stated that if a doctor's testi-
mony was not in accordance with the evidence she would not be 
inclined to give more weight to his testimony simply because 
he was a doctor. She also stated that she believed malpractice 
actions should be brought and that if they were warranted they 
would be certainly appropriate. (Tr • , p • 7 0 l ) • 
Each party exercised four peremptory challenges because 
of the addition of an alternate juror. One of Plaintiff's chal-
lenges was applied to Mrs. Eddins who, of course, did not serve 
on the jury panel. 
Mrs. Eddins was obviously candid in her answers and the 
trial court, who watched her demeanor and heard her testimony, 
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did not abuse its discretion in deci'di'ng th t h 
- a s e would be a 
qualified juror. 
B. The Authorities Cited by Appellant are Distinguishabl, 
~ 
Appellant cites several Utah cases in support of his pos~ 
tion that Venireman Eddins should have been dismissed from the 
panel. The Crawford v. Manning case, 542 P. 2d 1091 (Utah 1975) 
involved a potential juror who stated that "She had strong feel-
ings concerning anyone who would sue to recover money for the 
death of another." This testimony was similar to that given by 
Venireman Birkner and Venireman James Hewett (Tr., pp. 602-695) 
to which the trial court sustained Plaintiff's challenge for 
cause. (Tr. , p. 7 0 9) • 
In State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629 (Utah 1977) the prospec-
tive juror stated, "I feel very strongly against people that UH 
or sell narcotics. I don't know whether I could be fair in a 
verdict or not." Again, the prospective juror in that case was 
prejudiced against the type of action being brought. In this 
case, however, Mrs. Eddins stated that a malpractice action was 
perfectly appropriate and that they should be brought in appro-
priate cases. (Tr., p. 701). 
Finally, the case of State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 
1977) involved potential jurors who were personal friends of two 
of the prosecution witnesses. This Court held that the record 
· " h than a mere "ac· indicated that there was a "friendship rat er . 
quaintance." The trial court in this case believed that Mr. 
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Hudson had such a friendship relationship with the plaintiff's 
witnesses and accordingly dismissed him for cause. (T 710) r., p. • 
This review of Plaintiff's authorities clearly shows that 
the facts in each case must be examined and that the trial court 
must be given a large amount of discretion in determining whe-
ther a prospective juror is qualified. In this case the record 
shows that the trial court thoughtfully and carefully questioned 
numerous prospective jurors as to a variety of potential con-
flicts and in fact concluded that three of the prospective jur-
ors were not qualified. 
The trial court followed this Court's direction in the 
three previously cited cases and dismissed veniremen for those 
reasons stated in this Court's opinions. For this reason, there 
was no error committed by the trial court in the selection of 
the jury. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS RUL-
INGS REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTI-
MONY BY PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESSES. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Excluded Certain Portions of 
Testimony in Which Foundation was Lacking. 
This case was tried in September of 1977. It concerned an 
operation which had taken place in February of 1972. The trial 
court properly applied the law as it existed at the time the 
action arose and at the time of trial. 
In August of 1978 this Court decided Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 
814 (Utah 1978) where the majority held that the local community 
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standard should be changed to encompass a " · · 1 " s1m1 ar community 
standard with regard to expert testimony. 
It is manifestly unfair to hold that a trial court has 
erred in its rulings concerning a standard which was in exis-
tence at the time of the trial because of a subsequent change 
in the standard by a higher court. The decision in ~ is un· 
clear as to whether the new standard is applicable to actions 
arising prior to the decision. Respondent respectfully sub-
mits that Swan should be given only prospective effect and 
should not apply to causes of action or, at the very minimum, 
to trials which occurred prior to the rendering of the decision. 
This Court in numerous decisions has constantly held that 
rights, duties, and privileges should generally be changed only 
by the legislature or in rare instances by this Court; but ili~ 
in every case fair notice must be given to those who relied 
upon previous law. Rubalcava v. Gissmann, 384 P.2d 389 (Utah 
1963); Williams v. Utah State Department of Finance, 464 P.2d 
596 (Utah 1970); State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmer's 
Insurance Exchange, 493 P.2d 1002 (Utah 1972); Brunyer v. Sall 
Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 564 
P.2d 303 (1977); State v. Kelbach, 565 P.2d 700 (1977). 
Thus, any application of the strict locality rule by the 
trial court was not error since it conformed with the law exist· 
ing at the time of trial and the time the claim arose. Plain· 
tiff's claim at this time is therefore without merit. 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the "similar community" 
standard should have been applied by the trial court, the plain-
tiff failed to establish that either Los Angeles, California, 
the city in which Mr. Dyson the pump technician practiced, or 
Belmar, New Jersey, the city in which Dr. Bailey, the cardio-
vascular surgeon practiced, were "similar" to Salt Lake City. 
The Swan decision contains five separate opinions of the 
Justices of this Court. Justice Crockett in a special concur-
ring opinion stated the requirement of foundation as to a "simi-
larity" in communities: Justice Crockett stated: 
IIJt is also appreciated that in other spe-
cialized aspects of the practice of medicine, 
there are in fact different standards in dif-
ferent localities. In larger metropolitan 
areas where there are educational institu-
tions, hospitals and clinics, so that there 
are available more advanced facilities and 
equipment, and higher degrees of specializa-
tion in particular fields, and higher earn-
ings for practitioners, there are undoubtedly 
higher standards than in less favored areas. 
When this fact situation has a bearing on 
the problem involved, that is an important 
factor to be taken into account. 584 P.2d 
at 819. 
Justice Wilkins, in a concurring opinion, quoted an authority 
which also outlined the rule for foundational requirement. This 
rule states the following: 
[!Jn determining similarity the courts will 
not now look to such socio-economic facts as 
population, type of economy, and income level 
but to factors more directly relating to the 
practice of medicine. In the main, an expert 
practicing in a locality having medical fa-
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cilities comparable to those existing in the 
defendant's community is permitted to testify 
concerning the standard of care governing the 
defendant. The number and quality of hospi-
tals, laboratories and medical schools are 
typical considerations. 584 P.2d 820. 
The record is void of any comparisons between Salt Lake 
City's facilities, medical school, etc. with those of Los Angelo 
California and Belmar, New Jersey. Thus, even assuming argue~ 
that the similar community standard should have been applied by 
the trial court, even though it was not the applicable law at 
the time of trial, the plaintiff still failed to establish a 
proper foundation and any objections were rightfully sustained, 
In addition, unlike the Swan case, the plaintiff here made 
no proffer of proof as to what the witnesses would have said hac 
the objections not been sustained. Such proffer is necessacyil 
omission in testimony is claimed as error. Sun Cab Company v, 
Walston, 289 A.2d 804 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972). 
B. The Testimony of Mr. Charles Dyson and Dr. Charles 
Bailey Amply Covered the Alleged Negligence and Failure to Meet 
Standards of the Defendant and Therefore any Exclusion of Tes-
timony was Harmless Error. 
Plaintiff makes the following statement in his brief: 
Had the plaintiff's witness (Mr. Charles Dyson) 
been allowed to testify as to the standard of 
care in locales similar to Salt Lake City, Utah, 
he would have given testimony that would have 
shown that the defendant doctor's care of the 
plaintiff fell far below the existing and re-
cognized standard of care in similar localities 
with respect to operation of the heart-lung by-
pass pump machine. By refusing to allow such 
testimony, the plaintiff was prevented from pre-
senting to the jury the very heart of his case. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 25). 
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An examination of the record, however, shows that Mr. Dyson 
repeatedly gave his opinion as to a breach of standard committed 
by the defendant. 
Mr. Dyson stated that in his opinion there was a standard 
of practice among perfusion technicians throughout the country 
in February of 1972. (Tr., p. 1109). He testified that if the 
pump head was not adjusted for occlusion each time the tubing 
was changed that this would be a departure from the standard 
of practice of a capable, competent pump technician in accord-
ance with minimum standards in 1972. (Tr., p. 1116). He 
claimed that a capable, competent pump technician of 1972 should 
have understood the physiology of flow rates and should have 
known that the recorded flow rate of 1,100 cc's (as recorded by 
Defendant's pump technician during Plaintiff's operation) was 
completely erroneous. He also said that a capable, competent 
pump technician in 1972 should have been aware of certain laws 
of physiology as to minimum flow rate at various body temperatures. 
(Tr., p. 1127). 
In addition to these statements Mr. Dyson was also questioned 
by Plaintiff's attorney as to the following opinions: 
Q Do you have an opinion as to what the 
minimum standard of practice required 
with regard to observing and recording 
flow rates under these circumstances, 
sir? 
A The flow rates should have been ob-
served and recorded by the technician. 
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Q Can you explain why in your opinion 
the flow rates should be observed and 
recorded during the course of the pump 
run? 
A I just don't know how you can tell 
what you're doing if you don't know 
what you're flowing. Obviously, in a 
state of no'flow, that's what we call 
death. Now, you come above no flow 
and you get in a range that may sup-
port life and may not support life. 
Now, how do you know that the patient 
was getting an adequate amount of ar-
terialized blood unless you record it? 
Or, how can you ever say the patient 
was getting an adequate amount of ar-
terialized blood? (Tr., p. 1180). 
The witness also related that the minimum standard of tech· 
nicians in 1972 required that the temperature be recorded every 
10 minutes and that the standard required that the blood pressur: 
be recorded every 10 to 15 minutes. (Tr., p. 1181). 
Mr. Dyson stated that the average surgical team would use 
a higher flow rate than that which was used by Defendant upon 
the plaintiff. (Tr., p. 1182). He testified that the flow rate 
which was used on the plaintiff was the very lowest minimum star: 
dard and that at such a rate a blood gas sample should have been 
obtained to determine if sufficient oxygen was going into the 
blood. (Tr • , p • 118 2 ) • 
The preceding review amply illustrates that while the court 
sustained objections as to certain questions asked by Plaintiff, 
numerous opinions of the witness were introduced before the jury 
in terms of a "Jninbnum" standard of pump technicians in 1972. 
(_Tr • , p • 110 9 ) . 
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There is no doubt, moreover, that the testimony of Dr. 
Charles P. Bailey, Plaintiff's expert cardiovascular surgeon, 
was superior and repetitious to the testimony of Mr. Dyson who 
was merely a pump technician. Plaintiff himself admits that 
Dr. Bailey was allowed to testify as to the standard of care 
practiced in Salt Lake City. (Appellant's brief, p. 26). 
The omission, therefore, of any of Mr. Dyson's testimony, 
even assuming that such omission was erroneous, is not rever-
sible error. "Error may not be predicated upon the exclusion 
of evidence which is merely cumulative and does not add mater-
ially to the weight or clarity of that already received." 
Friesen v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, 524 P.2d 
1141, 1149 (Kan. 1974). See also, Watkins v. Utah Poultry 
and Farmers Cooperative, 251 P.2d 663 (Utah 1952). 
Dr. Bailey was given a hypothetical question based upon 
the facts developed in the previous testimony and asked whether 
or not the care given to Plaintiff in February of 1972 "was in 
accordance with the standard of care, diligence and caution 
that would be expected as a minimum standard of a capable, com-
petent, thoracic surgeon practicing in the locality of Salt Lake 
City, Utah." The doctor replied: "My opinion is that it was 
not up to the minimum acceptable standard of care. And if you 
would like, I will point out the way in which I think it wasn't 
satisfactory." (Tr., p. 1340). Dr. Bailey then proceeded to 
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describe in detail the reasons for this opinion including: 
inadequate blood flow rate (Tr., p. 1341-1342); the failure 
to use a rectal thermometer (Tr., p. 1344); the failure to use 
an adequate flow rate based upon a correct temperature (T r., 
pp. 1345-1346); the allowance of the blood pressure to drop be· 
low 50 mm's of mercury (Tr., p. 1348); and the negligence of 
Defendant in relying upon blood pressure alone to monitor the 
operation (Tr., pp. 1350-1351). 
Finally, Plaintiff's counsel asked this question of Dr. 
Bailey concerning the "pump perfusion team": 
Q Do you have an opinion as to whether the 
standard of practice of a pump perfusion 
team under the circumstances as we've 
described in February of 1972 required 
that the pump technician be aware of 
what the flow rates or the blood pres-
sure is of the patient during the course 
of a pump run such as this? 
* * * 
A At that time in medical history, as at 
the present time, the vast, the accumu-
lated opinion of doctors doing this kind 
of work is that you must know what your 
perfusion rate is, and that you will 
maintain it at an adequate level. (Tr., 
p. 1354). 
An accurate sUillHary of Dr. Bailey's testimony is also found in 
Appellant's Statement of Facts. (Appellant's brief, PP• 7-8). 
t, ny of The most that Appellant can say regarding the tes l.lllO 
Dr. Bailey is that "in all likelihood" the jurors viewed the 
k c · t based testimony as less authoritative than the Salt La e l Y 
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expert witnesses called by Defendant. (Appellant's brief, p. 
26). Such a claim goes to the weight of testimony, is mere spe-
culation, and does not constitute a sufficient ground for error. 
For these reasons, the trial court was correct in its rul-
ings as to the testimony of Plaintiff's expert witnesses. 
POINT III 
THE PROCEDURE UTILIZED IN FORMULATING AND 
OBJECTING TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS WAS NOT ER-
RONEOUS. 
There is no showing in the record that Plaintiff's attor-
neys were not given ample opportunity to object to the giving 
and refusal to give jury instructions. In addition, the legal 
authorities cited by Plaintiff in his brief are not on point 
since they do not deal with the specific question raised by the 
appellant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-33). 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unneces-
sary and that it is sufficient that a party, at the time the 
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, "make known to 
the court the action which he desires the court to take." 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure providesthat 
the court shall inform counsel of its proposed action with re-
gard to jury instruction requests prior to instructing the jury; 
and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed in-
structions. All objections must be made before the instructions 
are given to the jury or before the jury retires to consider its 
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verdict. 
Plaintiff's counsel during the argument for new trial and 
judgment n. o. v. ad:mi tted that a conference had been held prior 
to the formal exceptions to the,instructions before the court 
reporter. (Motion transcribed separately numbered Tr., pp. 
546-582; 562-563). Upon being asked by the court whether 
Plaintiff's counsel had an opportunity to consult with the c~rt 
prior to the time the exceptions were taken, Mr. Fairbourn re- , 
plied: 
Part of them, not all of the instructions. 
They were rather numerous instructions and 
in this particular case the court indicated 
to us that he had gone over the instructions 
and we were given a copy of the court's 
proposed instructions and we went over these 
with the court. (Tr., p. 563). 
This event was apparently unreported since there is no trans· 
cription of these conversations. Mr. Slagle, counsel for Defen· 
dant, stated the following concerning his recollection of the 
exceptions: 
It's my recollection and I think Mr. Fair-
bourn will bear this out, that we did not take 
a lunch break that day but rather had lunch 
in the courtroom. That when you came back, 
which was sometime before 12:50 we sat in the 
jury room in here for approximately an hour, 
assembled jury instructions, went through 
them with you and put them together. You 
marked all of our jury instructions as to whe-
ther they were given, not given, or given in 
substance. You then asked both of us whe-
ther or not, after we had gone through them 
with you, whether we had any serious objec-
tions that we needed to take at that time. 
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Now whether or not there was a court re-
porter, whether Mr. Midgley was in the jury 
room at that tbne I don't recall. At which 
time we both said Okay we told you what our 
serious objections were and you then said 
II f You can take your formal exceptions while 
I get a couple of these changes typed." 
(Tr . , p • 5 7 8 ) • 
Thus, the record fails to show that the objections of the 
Plaintiff with reference to jury instructions were not "made 
known to the court." Rule 46, U.R.C.P. 
In addition, the trial court was concerned at the Motion 
for a New Trial hearing that the plaintiff's counsel had not 
informed the court that his absence from the formal exceptions 
would be claimed as error. (Tr., p. 566). 
As stated by the court: "I don't have any independent re-
collection of either you or Mr. Dixon shaking, rattling and 
rolling me and saying if you don't do this, Judge, you're com-
rnitting error. Now maybe you did but it sure did not register." 
(Tr . , p • 5 6 6 ) • 
sel: 
The court in a further c0Jl1Illent stated to Plaintiff's coun-
IT]he thing I'm concerned with is whether 
or not, in connection with the instructions, 
if you saw that I was c0Jl1Illitting an error, 
and it's obvious that you're relying upon 
an error that you claim that I conrrnitted, 
whether or not the record reflects that you 
endeavored to have me correct that error be-
fore I continued on down the merry path 
that causes the problem. Now if the record 
so reflects that's fine. If it doesn't it 
would be a concern to me that where I have 
been led into an error by -my own doing I 
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thir.k there's a responsibility before coun-
sel to so advise the court that he's conunit-
ting an error and get it corrected. (Tr. , 
p. 568). 
The record shows no objection to the court's absence from the 
formal exceptions. 
Plaintiff's counsel admitted that "part" of the instruc-
tions had been discussed with the court prior to the time of 
the formal exceptions. (Tr., p. 563). There is also no show-
ing in the record as to which specific instructions were or 
were not discussed. Unless it can be shown that counsel was 
given no opportunity to discuss a particular instruction whict 
is claimed to have been erroneous, any failure to provide such 
opportunity is harmless error. Pagan v. Thrift City Inc., 460 
P.2d 832 (Utah 1969). 
The Rules of Civil Procedure, both federal and state, do 
not require that a formal, on-the-record discussion be held con· 
cerning jury instructions. The purpose of the rules is to pr~ 
vide the court and counsel with an opportunity to discuss and 
criticize the instructions prior to submission to the jury. 
In the instant case, it is clear that such an opportuni~ 
was present and there is nothing in the record showing that the 
trial court "refused to listen to counsel's objections." ~~ 
pellant's brief, p. 30). On the contrary, it appears from the 
discussion of the court and counsel during the motion for new 
trial that a conference was held discussing the instructions anc 
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that the trial court was not physically present during the taking 
of the formal exceptions because such matters had previously been 
discussed. 
If Plaintiff's counsel was unhappy with this procedure, a 
formal objection should have been lodged into the record stating 
which instructions had not been discussed with the trial court. 
This was not done and therefore Plaintiff has waived any claimed 
error. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WITH RESPECT 
TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
Appellants complain that two instructions should not have 
been given by the court (Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35) and that 
two instructions were erroneously omitted by the court. (Ap-
pellant's brief, p. 36). Both arguments are without merit. 
It is fundamental in determining the propriety of jury in-
structions that the instructions must be considered as a whole. 
Whyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1976). Applying this 
rule reveals that both instructions Number 12 and Number 11 
were proper in light of all the instructions given by the court. 
Appellant complains that Instruction Number 12 denied the 
opportunity of the jury to assess the testimony of Mr. Charles 
Dyson, the heart-lung by-pass pump machine technician. Appel-
lant states: 
By instructing the jury that only the tes-
timony of expert physicians could be relied 
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upon to establish the standard of care, 
the jury was erroneously misled into rejec-
ting out of hand all testimony given by the 
appellant's by-pass pump machine techni-
cian. (Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35). 
Instruction Number 18 giyen by the trial court clearly 
allows the testimony of Mr. Dyson to be considered in assess-
ing the standard to be utilized by pump technicians. This in-
struction reads: 
When a physician undertakes to use an em-
ployee to operate a coronary by-pass pump 
machine, he is expected to take reasonable 
steps to assure that the pump technician 
is properly trained and sufficiently know-
ledgeable under the circumstances to operate 
the machine prudently and safely. 
If you find that there were minimum stan-
dards of knowledge, skill, or diligence that 
were customarily exercised by other pump 
technicians under similar circumstances, in 
February of 1972 then you must determine 
whether or not in failing to have sufficient 
knowledge or in failing to exercise suff i-
cient skill or diligence as required by 
those minimum standards, there was a depart-
ure and if there was any injury caused by 
that departure, then Dr. Parrish is liable 
for that injury. (R., p. 465) (Emphasis 
added). 
As previously noted, the testimony of Mr. Dyson was to the 
effect that there was a 1972 standard for pump technicians and 
that this standard had been violated during the operation on 
Plaintiff. Thus, the two instructions together established~~ 
the standard for the physician himself and the vicarious stan-
dard for the physician employing a pump technician. 
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Appellant now co.mplains about Instruction No. 11 as not 
properly presenting Plaintiff's theory of the case. Plaintiff 
claims that the instructions should have informed the jury 
that failure to obtain blood gas tests and to monitor the pa-
tient's temperature were additional factors which could have 
resulted in negligence. 
It is Plaintiff's obligation to formulate and present an 
instruction of his case theory and present it to the trial court 
for consideration. The record is barren of any proposed in-
struction by Plaintiff specifically referring to blood gas or 
monitoring of temperature. (R., pp. 410-420.) Likewise, there 
is no exception in the record as to the failure of the court to 
give a requested instruction by Plaintiff specifically referring 
to blood gas and temperature monitoring. (Tr., pp. 1833-1839). 
As stated by this Court: 
If Defendants desired instructions on de-
fenses ••• they should propose them. Fer-
guson v. Jongsma, 350 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah 
1960). 
This same rule is equally applicable to claims of a plaintiff. 
In addition, the court in several other instructions re-
peatedly told the jury that the defendant would be negligent if 
he failed to "exercise such care and diligence as was ordinarily 
exercised by physicians and surgeons doing the same type of work 
in the Salt Lake civinity or similar locality." (Instructions 
Numbers s, 9, 12, and 13; R. 1 pp. 455, 456, 459, 460). 
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Certainly, the failure to monitor blood aas and tempe ~ ra-
ture could be considered by the jury as the failure to "~er . 
'-Jo. cise 
care and diligence required of physicians or required of pump 
technicians. There was ampl~ testimony by Plaintiff's witness 
that such standards, in their opinions, were breached. (Tr,, 
pp. 1181-1183). It was, therefore, not necessary, in the ab-
sence of a specific request by Plaintiff, to include each fac-
tor of the claimed negligence in the general instruction out-
lining Plaintiff's case. 
Finally, Plaintiff complains that his Instructions Numbers 
6 and 7 concerning the credibility to be given to deposition 
and video-tape testimony were wrongfully excluded. (R.' pp. 
391, 392). Plaintiff states: "It is likely that members of th1 
jury would tend to discount testimony by deposition in compari-
son to live testimony from witnesses they can see and hear." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3 6} . Such a statement is mere specula-
tion on the part of Plaintiff. 
In addition, the testimony referred to in Instructions N~· 
bers 6 and 7 is basically concerned with medical causation and 
damages--not negligence. Dr. William Hoyt, a San Francisco 
neuro-ophthalmologist, testified on video tape as to the extent 
of the damage to Plaintiff's eyesight and the fact it was pro· 
bably caused by hypoxia. Likewise, Dr. Ward Woods, a San Diego 
neurosurgeon, testified by deposition as to the neurological 
damage to the plaintiff and the resulting symptoms. (Tr., PP· 
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1474-1536). 
Since neither of these medical witnesses was qualified in 
the area of medicine practiced by Defendant, the value of their 
testimony was only to evaluate the extent of damage and to hy-
pothesize that such damage could have been caused during open-
heart surgery. However, since the jury did not reach the ques-
tion of damages, the importance of this depositional testimony 
was obviously minimal. Any error, therefore, was harmless. 
For these reasons, the trial court was correct in the in-
structions given to the jury. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING 
TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT TO AUTHENTI-
CATE TEXTBOOKS. 
Plaintiff complains that Defendant Dr. Parrish "evasively 
refused to acknowledge any of the experts or "!:heir medical texts" 
propounded by Plaintiff. (Appellant's brief, p. 39). Such a 
characterization is unjustified as is shown by the record. The 
testimony of Defendant is consistent that he was either unaware 
of the reputation of the offered authority, was not familiar with 
their textbook, or was not familiar with the authority. 
(Tr., pp. 839-846). 
The defendant, on several occasions, testified that because 
of the rapidly changing field his information comes mainly from 
monthly periodicals and not from textbooks. (Tr., pp. 844-845). 
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Thus, with Dr. Parrish failing to recognize or authenticate 
the 
textbooks inquired of by Plaintiff an attempt was made to au-
thenticate these materials through Plaintiff's own expert wit-
ness, Dr. Charles Bailey. (R., pp. 1379-1383). The court 
properly refused to allow Dr. Bailey to authenticate these r~ 
ferences for the purpose of later cross-examining Defendant 
Dr. Parrish. 
Plaintiff's position, as argued in his brief, is that when 
an expert witness fails to recognize or authenticate a textbook 
or reference the opposition should be allowed to authenticate 
such textbook or reference using their own expert witnesses, 
At that point, the book or reference, now authenticated, can 
be used for cross examination of the opposing expert. 
While this procedure has been adopted by some states, most 
states still require that an authority or reference may only be 
used to cross examine a witness who has specifically recognized 
or depended upon such source as a basis of the witness's direct 
testimony. 
A few recent examples of those states following the tradi-
tional rule are as follows: Arizona: Purcell v. Zimbelman, 
500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. App. 1972); California: Hope v. Arrowhead, 
344 P.2d 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Colorado: Ross v. Colorado 
National Bank of Denver, 463 p.2d 882 (Colo. 1969); Maryland: 
Fleming v. Prince George's County, 358 A.2d 892 (Md. 1976); 
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Minnesota: Rosenthal v. Kola.rs, 231 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1975); 
New Jersey: Swank v. Halivopoulis, 260 A.2d 240 (N.J. super. 
1969); New York: Florrence v. Goldberg, 369 N.Y.S.2d 794 (N.Y. 
A.D. 1975); and Texas: Webb v. Jorns, 530 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. 
Civil. App. 1975). 
These states apply the traditional rule, followed by the 
trial court, that an expert witness may only be cross examined 
as to specific authorities and references he bases his opinion 
upon during direct examination or as to authorities he specifi-
cally recognizes as authorities. If the witness bases his opin-
ion solely upon his own experience and does not authenticate 
any authorities he cannot be held accountable for information 
contained in those authorities and therefore cannot be cross 
examined about them. 32 C.J.S., Section 574, pp. 694-699. 
Some states have enacted statutes which specifically allow 
medical textbooks to be used as direct evidence in a malpractice 
action. See Note, "Medical Malpractice--Expert Testimony" 60 
N.W. u. L. Rev. 834 1966; Note, "Statutory and Common Law Inno-
vations", 45 Minn. L. Rev., 1019 (1961). In such cases the 
textbook assumes the status of a live witness even though the 
defense does not have the opportunity to cross examine the au-
thor. Fortunately, Utah has not adopted this procedure. 
A hybrid between the use of textbooks as direct evidence 
and the requirement of authentication by the expert witness 
himself is the position now advocated by Plaintiff that a text-
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book may be used for cross examination if it is authentic t 
a ed b·, 
the opposing party's expert. The obvious difficulty with this 
procedure is that the two experts may have wide differences in 
opinion as to what is a "reputable" source or as to what is a 
"widely accepted" source. 
In this case, for example, had Dr. Bailey recognized and 
authenticated a textbook by Dr. John Doe and had Dr. Parrish 
denied that Dr. John Doe was an authority or denied that the 
textbook contained correct information or disavowed any knowledg: 
of either John Doe or the textbook, the jury would ultimately 
be faced with the same question it was in the present trial: 
Is Dr. Bailey more knowledgeable and reputable in the field of 
cardiovascular surgery than is Dr. Parrish? 
In other words, the authenticated textbook, in cases where 
the witness disavows the author or the material, is only as good 
and credible as the expert witness authenticating it. 
Rather than contributing any useful information to the jury 
the introduction of the intermediary textbook can only serve to 
confuse them since the authenticating witness could probably 
have stated the same information directly without any reference 
to any textbook. 
Plaintiff finally argues that such references can be ad-
mitted into evidence as "scientific books" which contain "evi-
dence of facts of general notoriety and interest" pursuant to 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-25-6 ll953l. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 42) · SUch an argument is without merit since it is 
patently obvious that the procedure used in open-heart surgery 
does not fall into the category of how many feet are in a mile 
or an actuarial table of life spans. (Appellant's brief, p. 
42). 
For these reasons, the trial court was correct in exclud-
ing Dr. Bailey's testimony relating to an attempt to authenti-
cate medical treatises which were neither relied upon nor recog-
nized by Dr. Parrish during his direct examination 
POINT VI 
DR. RUSSELL NELSON WAS NEITHER A "SURPRISE" 
WITNESS NOR DID HE TESTIFY IMPROPERLY. 
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. 
Russell Nelson to testify in controvention of the pre-trial or-
der and in rendering an opinion on matters other than rebuttal 
to the testimony of Charles Dyson. Such contention is totally 
without substance. 
Plaintiff asserts that Judge Baldwin in the pretrial con-
ference required "each party to disclose all witnesses who would 
be called at trial." (Appellant's brief, p. 44). As authority 
for this proposition Appellants cite the Affidavit of Clayton 
Fairbourn, co-counsel for Plaintiff. (R., pp. 494-495). 
There is no doubt that the parties exchanged the names of 
witnesses during the pretrial conference as evidenced by the 
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minute order of Judge Baldwin. CB., p. 336). There is no 
record, however, supporting Plaintiff's claim that Judge Bald-
win ordered that no other witnesses could be called e~cept 
those exchanged at the conference. Defendant has adamantly 
denied this assertion during and after the trial. 
1739, 577). 
lTr., pp. 
In a conference with counsel immediately prior to the com-
mencement of the trial, each side listed their witnesses for 
the judge so that he could inform the jury as to their names. 
Mr. Slagle, attorney for Defendant, listed the names of approxi-
mately ten witnesses and then stated, "At the present time that'; 
all the witnesses I know of. It may be necessary, of course, 
to call others, Your Honor, as the evidence develops in rebut-
tal." The court replied, "I understand that." (R., p. 660). 
The court also informed the jury after reading the list of 
witnesses that "it may be there are additional witnesses whom 
they desire to call." (Tr., p. 681). Thus, even in the be-
ginning it is clear that the attorneys for the parties and t~ 
court were aware that witnesses other than those specifically 
exchanged may be called. 
Near the conclusion of the trial Dr. Russell Nelson took the 
stand on behalf of the defendant. At that time Plaintiff's coun· 
sel objected that Dr. Nelson was a surprise witness and that,~ 
any case, he could only testify to rebut the testimony of Mr. 
Dyson. t Tr • , p • 17 3 8 j • 
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Mr. Slagle acknowledged that Dr. Nelson was not listed as 
a witness but it was pointed out that Mr. Dixon, co-counsel for 
Plaintiff, on the Wednesday or Thursday of the first week of 
trial was informed that Dr. Nelson may be used as a rebuttal 
witness and that Plaintiff had therefore known about Nelson 
for two weeks. (Tr., p. 1739). 
Furthermore, Slagle stated that he never intended on using 
Dr. Nelson only to rebut Dyson's testimony and that the defense 
did not have to anticipate every bit of evidence that may be 
used in rebuttal. (Tr . , p . 1 7 3 9 ) . 
After being told by Plaintiff's counsel that Judge Baldwin 
ordered that no other witnesses except those exchanged could be 
called at trial, the court replied: 
Well, even if the court did order that, I pre-
sume that one is entitled to bring on any other 
witnesses he may desire in connection with the 
matter in rebuttal if its necessary. I don't 
think anybody is precluded if the exigencies 
of the situation were to indicate it such being 
the case. 
* * * 
I suppose if there was something testified to, 
and there is the desire to rebut it, I suppose 
that is an exigency that may arise. 
* * * 
Well, the court is not going to preclude him 
from presenting his evidence if he believes 
that it's necessary to present it. (Tr., PP· 
1740). 
Thus, the conference at trial revealed that Plaintiff was 
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aware of Dr. Nelson's possible testimony two weeks pri'or to his 
being called and that the trial court never limited hi t s esti-
mony to strictly rebuttal of Mr. Dyson's testimony. (Appellant' 
brief, p. 46). 
Appellant cites the case of Bertram v. Harris, 423 P.2d 
909 (Ala. 1967) in support of his position that a pretrial or-
der has to be followed precisely by the trial court. In that 
case, however, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated that a trial 
court is still left with discretion as to whether a witness 
should be excluded from trial if not listed in a pretrial order, 
The court stated: 
Whether or not we will interfere with such 
discretion as in other cases where discre-
tion is involved, depends on whether the dis-
cretion was abused, which would be the case 
only if we were left with the definite and 
firm conviction on the record that the judge 
had made a mistake in deciding as he did to 
exclude or not to exclude a witness not lis-
ted in accordance with the order for a pre-
trial conference. Id. at 917. 
Even assuming arguendo that Judge Baldwin required all wit· 
nesses to be listed at the pretrial conference and stated t~t 
no surprise witnesses would be allowed, the trial court had dis· 
cretion to decide whether a witness was a "surprise" and discre· 
tion as to the scope of the witness's testimony. The record 
shows that the trial court did not abuse this discretion. Cf 
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963). 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE DR. 
RUSSELL NELSON. 
Appellant devotes a significant number of pages in his 
brief to support and acclaim the virtues of cross examination. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 48-59). Respondent basically agrees 
with all of the legal authorities cited by Appellant and concurs 
that cross examination is an essential tool at any trial. 
However, when these legal principles are specifically ap-
plied to the facts of this case it becomes evident that no right 
of cross examination was denied. 
Appellant complains that he was unable to cross examine 
Dr. Russell Nelson as to whether he performed surgery in the 
same way described in the hypothetical. (Tr., p. 1747). Appel-
lant states that this question "went to the heart of the witness's 
testimony, the standard of care by which the defendant's conduct 
was to be judged." (Appellant's brief, pp. 53-54). 
It was established many years ago that what an individual 
physician does in his medical practice is irrelevant and imma-
terial to how another physician performs in his practice. The 
Utah Supreme Court said: 
The witness was asked to give his opinion of 
various steps in the method of treatment adopted 
by Dr. Shields and then to give his opinion of 
the method as a whole. To pennit him to answer 
sets his opinion up as a basis from which to 
determine whether Dr. Shields was negligent or 
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not. It is an effort to set off or.e opin-
ion against another as proof of error in the 
latter, whereas the standard of care resuired 
of a surgeon is that he exercise the reason-
able care, skill, and diligence as is ordin-
arily exercised by--not one surgeon--but sur-
geons generally, not ~o mention for the moment, 
the question of restricting the general group 
to any particular community or locality. It 
is our opinion that the questions were fatally 
defective by reason of calling for a compari-
son with only one opinion rather than a gen-
eral group. And the lower court was correct 
in ruling the answers out. Coon v. Shields, 
39 P.2d 348 (Utah 1934) (Emphasis added). 
Thus, Dr. Nelson's personal practice and manner in which hE 
performs surgery is immaterial and irrelevant as to a direct 
comparison with the practices of Dr. Parrish. Had Dr. Nelson, 
however, "testified previously that he based his opinion" 
as to the standard of practice in Salt Lake City in 1972 upon 
his own practice as well as the practice of other doctors it 
probably would have been proper to inquire further as to the 
foundation of his opinion. 
The record is void of any reference as to what elements 
comprised the standard in which he formulated. For this reason, 
the question as asked was irrelevant to the formulation of the 
standard which Dr. Nelson had previously related. 
The trial court is given considerable discretion in decid· 
ing whether evidence submitted is relevant. Barnbrough v. Be-
thers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). In ruling upon questions 
during the examination of witnesses, and more particularly the 
cross examination, the trial court has considerable latitude, 
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and its rulings will not be held to be reversible error unless 
it appears that they are clearly erroneous and, generally 
speaking, prejudicial. Good v. West Seattle Gen. Hosp. Corp. 
335 P. 2d 590, 593 (Wash. 1959). 
As stated previously, the court did not abuse its discre-
tion in ruling that the question of Dr. Nelson's personal prac-
tice was irrelevant to the establislunent of the community stan-
dard without a showing that this was a factor comprising the 
opinion. In addition, the failure to answer the question was 
not prejudicial since Plaintiff effectively obtained the answer 
from Dr. Nelson in the questions following the cited question. 
The following dialogue occurred: 
Q (By Mr. Dixon) Dr. Nelson, did--have 
you reviewed vividly the practices of 
the other doctors in the community to 
determine whether or not they were 
practicing surgery in the same way that 
was described in that hypothetical? 
A I've been doing heart surgery here for 
22 years and am pretty well acquainted 
with the work of the others in the 
area. 
Q And did they generally practice the 
same way you do? 
A surgeons are like concert pianists; 
each one is highly individual, highly 
different, and yet obedient to certain 
basic rules. 
Q One of those basic rules is that the 
body needs a certain amount of oxy-
genation; isn't that correct? 
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A But the defining of that limit is sub-
ject to a good deal of dispute. (Tr., 
p. 1747). 
The doctor, in effect, admitted that he practiced in the 
same way as other doctors in ,the community and then proceeded 
to explain the certain "basic rules" as propounded by Plain-
tiff's attorney. (Tr . , pp • 1747-1762 ) • 
Plaintiff's counsel thoroughly examined Dr. Nelson's tes-
timony as to how open-heart surgery should be performed and 
such testimony was clearly based upon the doctor's own opinion 
and experience. 
Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to allow the question as framed to be answered but in still per 
mitting examination of Dr. Nelson's personal practice and 
opinions as to the standard of open-heart surgery. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the trial court did not err or abuse its discre 
in the selection of jurors, the admissability of testimony, the 
procedures and substance of jury instructions, or in trial proc 
generally. 
For the reasons outlined in this brief, the judgment of the 
jury should be affirmed. 
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